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Coordinating Policies with Japan
Behind the recentcalls for japan to followmore
expansionary policies is the notion that coun-
tries running trade surpluses, and not just those
with trade deficits, have an obligation to adjust
their domestic financial policies to help achieve
international payments balance. Asking both
deficit and surplus countries to direct domestic
financial policies toward achieving external bal-
ance is tantamount to calling for international
policy coordination. To evaluate the desirability
of policy coordination with japan, it is useful
first to consider some recent developments in
the u.s. and japanese trade balance positions
and the two countries' respective financial
policies.
Trade linkages to fiscal policies
Interest in the u.s. over international policy
coordination has risen in tandem with the u.s.
multilateral trade deficit, and the bilateral trade
with japan in particular. Although the u.s. has
had a multilateral trade deficit in every year
since 1975, a major shift occurred in the early
1980s when the trade imbalance began to grow
exponentially. The U.s. trade deficit increased
more than fourfold between 1981 and 1986-
from $40 billion to $170 billion. Similarly, the
U.s. bilateral deficit with japan grew more than
threefold during this period, climbing from $18
billion in 1981 to $59 billion in 1986. In sharp
contrast,the japanese multilateral trade surplus
broke previous record highs and grew from $9
billion in 1981 to $83 billion in 1986.
The most important element in the trade balance
situation is that the u.s. and japan have pursued
diametrically opposed fiscal policy stances since
the early 1980s.The U.s. in 1981 implemented
a major tax reduction that provided a significant
fiscal stimulus to the economy but also resulted
in a string of unprecedentedly large peacetime
budget deficits. japan, in contrast, embarked in
1979 upon a period of fiscal restraint with the
intent of reducing its budget deficit problem that
had begun in the early 1970s.
The basic macroeconomic explanation for the
causal linkages between budget deficits and
trade deficits is well-known. The cut in U.s.
taxes generated a rise in the budget deficit that
needed to be financed. In concept, this financ-
ing requirement could have been met by either a
rise in net private domestic saving (private
domestic saving less private investment) or by a
capital inflow from abroad (foreign saving).
In the case of the United States, the rise in the
budget deficit was not accompanied by a sub-
stantial increase in net private domestic saving.
The US private saving rate-low both by his-
torical and international standards - increased
little. U.s. private investment was moderately
strong. The result is that foreign funds were
relied upon to finance our budget deficit.
In contrast to the U.S., the rise in japan's budget
deficit in the early 1970s coincided with a sharp
rise in its net private saving surplus. The after-
math of the first oil price shock consisted of a
sharp fall in the rate of domestic investment and
a fall in aggregate demand that prompted japan
to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy. The
high private saving rate remained steady. japan's
growing budget deficits therefore were financed
from domestic private saving that had earlier
been directed at strong corporate investment
demands. japan's shift from budget surplus in
the early 1970s to a series of deficits peaking at
an equivalent of 5.5 percent of GNP in 1978 did
not result in foreign capital inflows into japan
and associated trade deficits.
At the end of the 1970s, however, japan under-
took a major shift in fiscal policy. japan adopted
a moderately restrictive fiscal stance to reduce
budget deficits and to slow the growth of a pub-
lic debt that had grown fivefold since the
mid-1970s. The restrictive policy stance was
successful in gradually reducing the general gov-
ernment budget deficits to the equivalent of
about 1.5 percent of GNP.
A consequence of lower total government bud-
get deficits in the 1980s in the face of continued
strength in net private saving is that japan has
been flush with funds to lend to the rest of theFRBSF
world. Capital outflows from Japan, also spurred
by significant deregulation of international finan-
cial transactions associated with the 1980 For-
eign Exchange Law, were largely responsible for
Japan's increasingly large trade surpluses. Surg-
ing Japanese exports found their way to world
markets generally, and to u.s. markets in par-
ticular. U.s. markets were particularly lucrative
because ofthe strong dollar and the high rate of
aggregate demand growth in the u.s. associated
with the fiscal expansion in the aftermath of the
tax cut begun in 1981.
Japanese aggregate demand policy
Given the enormous Japanese trade surplus ($83
billion in 1986) and u.s. trade deficit ($170 bil-
lion in 1986), there has been growing pressure
on both nations to adjust their financial policies
to reduce external imbalances. Policy coordina-
tion to achieve this objective would call for a
rise in domestic aggregate demand growth rela-
tive to output growth in Japan, and a decline in
domestic aggregate demand growth relative to
output growth in the u.S. The appropriate
response under these circumstances would nor-
mally be expansionary monetary and fiscal pol-
icies in Japan, and contractionary or neutral
policies in the u.s.
A major constraint to such monetary policy
moves in early 1985 was the strong value ofthe
dollar exchange rate. An expansionary monetary
policy in Japan carried out immediately would
likely have pushed the yen yet lower against the
dollar. Instead, Japan agreed in the September
1985 Group of Five meeting in New York City to
follow a restrictive monetary policy stance coor-
dinated with other central banks and
aggressively supported the yen in the foreign
exchange markets. The Bank ofJapan spent $2
billion in foreign reserves and engineered a
major tightening of monetary conditions.
Interbank rates were raised to 8 percent from
under 6 percent between September and
December 1985 with the sole objective of caus-
ing an appreciation of the value of the yen
against the dollar. Domestic conditions at the
time didnot warrant monetary restraint, and the
actions had the effect ofslowing aggregate
demand growth in Japan.
Needless to say, the strategy worked: monetary
contraction in Japan during the second half of
1985 helped sustain the rise of the yen against
the dollar that had begun in February. But as
confidence in the dollar was shaken, the yen's
continued rapid advance through the end of
1985 and into 1986 surprised both Japanese pol-
icymakers and economists. The recent apprecia-
tion to the 140 per dollar range is the yen's
strongest value ever.
The desirable aspect of both high interest rates
and a strong yen was that they helped position
the Bank ofJapan to adopt an aggressive expan-
sionary monetary stance and to expand aggre-
gate demand at the beginning of 1986. The
Japanese discount rate was lowered in four steps
in 1986 to 3 percentfrom 5 percent, and again
in February 1987 to 2.5 percent - a historic
low. Money market rates quickly responded and
fell to 4 percent by the end of 1986. Average
lending rates ofJapanese banks for both short-
and long-term loans have declined to their
lowest levels in the postwar period.
Reflecting the easy stance of monetary policy
that has continued to this day is the strong
money growth in Japan. Narrow money (M1)
growth in Japan was 9.1 percent in 1986, com-
pared with 5 percent in 1985 and a 5.6 percent
averageover the 1980~84 period. As a conse-
quence, real domestic demand grew 4.0 percent
in Japan in 1986 while real GNP grew only 2.5
percent. This faster domestic demand growth
relative to output growth was reflected in a
decline in Japan's trade surplus in real terms, or
volume, last year.
Moreover, projections for 1987 and 1988 sug-
gest that growth in real domestic demand will
continue to outstrip output growth, and that the
fall in Japan's trade surplus will continue. For
example, the International Monetary Fund in
April projected that Japan's current account sur-
plus would gradually fall from 4.4 percent of
GNP in 1986 to 3.7 percent this year and 3.4
percent in 1988. Revisions in this forecast taking
into account the recently announced stimulative
fiscal package (discussed below) are likely to
suggest an even greater fall in the Japanese trade
surplus.
The transition of Japan's economy away from its
heavy reliance on export-led growth in the early
1980s will not prove easy, however, despite
monetary and fiscal moves toward expansion.
Real GNP grew only 2.5 percent in 1986, down
from 4.7 percent annually over the 1975-1984
period. Unemployment presently stands at about
3 percent of the labor force - the highest since
the government began keeping labor statistics in
1953. Moreover, real GNP growth is also pro-
jected to be weak this year despite monetary
ease and the recently announced fiscal
measures.Slower Japanese economic growth is not,
however, an entirely bad omen as it is the result
of weakened foreign demand caused by rapid
appreciation of the yen and not by a shortage of
domestic demand. Real exports of commodities
fell 1.3 percent in 1986, while real imports rose
12.5 percent. Total domestic demand growth in
Japan, therefore, is not translating into domestic
output growth, and thus the Japanese trade sur-
plus is declining in real terms. This is the neces-
sary, but difficult, process of adjustment as Japan
moves to become an economy less dependent
on exports and as it reduces its trade surpluses.
Fiscal action and policy coordination
The fiscal stimulus package announced by Japan
on May 29 amounts to another step to coordi-
nate its financial policies with the U.S. as it will
complement the effects of expansionary mone-
tary policy in stimulating aggregate demand
growth. The primary objective of the six trillion
yen ($43 billion) package of spending measures
and tax cuts is clear: to lower Japan's trade sur-
plus by exporting less and importing more. As
part of the package, in fact, the Japanese govern-
ment plans to spend $1 billion to buy foreign
goods.
Analysts differ as to the magnitude of the likely
effects of the fiscal package on aggregate
demand and real GNP growth in Japan. In large
part, the impact depends on the timing and
composition of the proposed $8 billion tax cut
and $35 billion rise in expenditures, but several
considerations suggest that the new supplemen-
tary budget package will significantly raise
aggregate demand and output inJapan. First, the
new supplementary budget is substantially larger
than previously expected and amounts to about
1.8 percent of GNP. Second, it is better struc-
tured than previous supplementary budgets to
ensure that planned outlays are actually dis-
bursed. That is, the government and its agencies
are to finance most of the package and a signifi-
cantly larger amount is represented by public
works expenditures, in contrast to last year's
supplementary budget.
Japan's recent willingness to accommodate the
U.s. demand for greater domestic expansion is
not entirely associated with external pressure, of
course. Japanese policymakers are very much
concerned with sluggish real GNP growth and
the spectre of rising unemployment. Under the
present circumstances, they recognize that mon-
etary expansion alone is not sufficient to offset
the fall-off in external demand. Nonetheless,
these concerns appear a secondary motivation
compared with the desire to reduce trade
surpluses.
In this light, perhaps most noteworthy about the
recently announced expenditure and tax mea-
sures is that they represent a marked departure
from Japan's earlier policy of fiscal austerity.
Japan appears, at least temporarily, to have
moved away from its long-term objective of
budget deficit reduction to accommodate exter-
nal pressures for greater aggregate demand
growth. Ifthis perception were correct, Japan's
actions would amount to the subordination of a
long-term national policy objective to the desire
to cooperate internationally in moves designed
to reduce the country's trade surpluses.
Complementing Japan's moves, the U.S. has also
acted to reduce its large government budget def-
icit. The U.s. general governmentbudget deficit
declined from 3.5 percent of GNP in 1985 to
3.2 percent in 1986, and is projected to be less
than 3 percent this year.
For the first time in over a decade, Japan and the
u.s. have actually coordinated their financial
policies. The results are already being felt. Both
the U.s. trade deficit and the Japanese trade sur-
plus declined significantly in terms of volume
last year. Significant reductions in current dollar
terms are likely to occur this year. Even in the
best of circumstances, however, trade balance
adjustments take time. Japanese trade surpluses
and U.S. trade deficits saw five years of uninter-
rupted growth before they reached their present
levels. It may take an equally long adjustment
period to bring them down to a sustainable
position.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 204,649 166 2,786 1.3
Loans and leases' 6 181,387 104 - 2,216 - 1.2
Commercial and Industrial 50,993 - 38 - 324 - 0.6
Real estate 69,689 93 2,683 4.0
Loans to Individuals 36,984 - 115 - 3,966 - 9.6
Leases 5,441 4 - 61 - 1.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,331 110 5,702 53.6
OtherSecurities2 6,930 - 50 - 702 - 9.1
Total Deposits 207,950 3,448 - 45 0.0
Demand Deposits 53,179 2,511 230 0.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,214 907 - 12,624 - 25.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,236 822 3,076 17.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,535 115 - 3,351 - 2.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,477 146 - 2,299 - 4.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,347 - 300 - 4,559 - 12.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,229 106 13 0.0
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change